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Advances in the use of neuroimaging in combination with A.I., and specifically the use of
machine learning techniques, have led to the development of brain-reading technologies
which, in the nearby future, could have many applications, such as lie detection,
neuromarketing or brain-computer interfaces. Some of these could, in principle, also
be used in forensic psychiatry. The application of these methods in forensic psychiatry
could, for instance, be helpful to increase the accuracy of risk assessment and to identify
possible interventions. This technique could be referred to as ‘A.I. neuroprediction,’
and involves identifying potential neurocognitive markers for the prediction of recidivism.
However, the future implications of this technique and the role of neuroscience and A.I. in
violence risk assessment remain to be established. In this paper, we review and analyze
the literature concerning the use of brain-reading A.I. for neuroprediction of violence
and rearrest to identify possibilities and challenges in the future use of these techniques
in the fields of forensic psychiatry and criminal justice, considering legal implications
and ethical issues. The analysis suggests that additional research is required on A.I.
neuroprediction techniques, and there is still a great need to understand how they
can be implemented in risk assessment in the field of forensic psychiatry. Besides the
alluring potential of A.I. neuroprediction, we argue that its use in criminal justice and
forensic psychiatry should be subjected to thorough harms/benefits analyses not only
when these technologies will be fully available, but also while they are being researched
and developed.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment is a crucial component of the criminal justice system. In recent years, there has
been a growing interest in the development of new tools and techniques to improve risk assessment
in the field of forensic psychiatry and criminal justice (Monahan and Skeem, 2015). Currently,
more than 200 violence risk assessment tools, often integrated clinical-actuarial instruments,
have been developed to predict violent, antisocial, and sexual behavior (Singh et al., 2014), and
their use seems to be vastly increasing in criminal justice settings (Conroy and Murrie, 2007).
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The central aim of these methods is to identify high-risk and low-
risk offenders correctly. Depending on the jurisdiction, they are
used to inform a range of medico-legal decisions, for instance
regarding sentencing, parole, civil commitment, death penalty,
disposition in juvenile courts, and discharge following findings
of insanity (Conroy and Murrie, 2007). In recent years, A.I.
(Artificial Intelligence) is being used to enhance the predictive
accuracy of risk assessment.
The use of algorithmic risk assessment has grown along
with the research in the field of neuroimaging, leading to the
development of ‘brain-reading’ techniques that are, to some
limited extent, able to decode mental states based on a person’s
brain activity (Haynes and Rees, 2006), or to classify people
in groups based on their brain structure and functionality
(Koutsouleris et al., 2012). A possible forensic application of the
technique is to identify dangerous offenders. The combination
of A.I. and neuroimaging has led to the development of what
can be called ‘A.I. neuroprediction,’ which is the use of structural
or functional brain parameters coupled with machine learning
methods to make clinical or behavioral predictions. Perhaps, in
the near future, A.I. neuroprediction could be more generally
used to predict the risk of recidivism in forensic psychiatry and
criminal justice. However, application of such techniques raises
legal and ethical issues.
The purpose of this paper is to identify possibilities
and challenges regarding the possible future use of A.I.
neuroprediction of violence and recidivism in the fields of
forensic psychiatry and criminal justice, discussing legal
implications and ethical issues. In the next section, we will discuss
risk-assessment techniques. In the third section, we consider
current ‘brain-reading’ techniques that use neuroimaging
coupled with A.I. In the fourth section, we provide an overview
of recent neuroprediction studies using neuroimaging data
coupled with A.I. to predict recidivism. In the fifth section,
we discuss technological limitations and pitfalls of predictive
analysis. Finally, in the sixth section, we discuss the ethical and
legal issues raised by the application of these techniques.
RISK ASSESSMENT: THE STATE OF THE
ART
In the past two decades, in both the US and Europe,
interest in and research on violence risk assessment tools have
significantly increased, providing different approaches varying
from strictly actuarial tools, based on regression, to algorithmic
risk assessment, providing a probabilistic estimate of reoffending,
to structured professional judgment (Hart, 1998; Douglas and
Kropp, 2002). Initially, actuarial methods dominated the field, but
their predictive value remained quite limited, if not disappointing
(Fazel et al., 2012).
Risk variables associated with an increased likelihood
of an individual acting violently or aggressively include
criminogenic needs (individual characteristics that increase the
risk of recidivism), demographics, socioeconomic status, and
intelligence (Gendreau et al., 1996). Risk factors are typically
divided into static factors, that are historical and do not change
(e.g., criminal history, offense types, childhood abuse) and
dynamic factors that are, in principle, changeable and therefore
they provide the opportunity for intervention, modifying future
risk (e.g., impulsivity, drug use, social support, job, compliance
with treatment). Some dynamic factors are quite stable, while
others are more “fluid.” Dynamic factors need to be measured
multiple times, sometimes within short intervals.
At present, the results of risk assessment tools, however, are far
from perfect, especially for long term prediction; current criminal
risk assessment tools show poor to moderate accuracy, and a good
balance between false positives and false negatives is an issue that
should be considered, depending both on the social and political
context and on the stage of the criminal justice process in which
the tool is used (Douglas et al., 2017). Generally, when a risk
assessment tool classifies an individual as low-risk, it is often
correct. However, if the tool classifies someone as high risk, this
is quite often incorrect, and almost more than half of individuals
targeted as high-risk are incorrectly classified (Fazel et al., 2012).
False positives (defendants are predicted to re-offend, but they do
not) seem to be more common than false negatives (defendants
are predicted not to re-offend, but they do) (Fazel et al., 2012).
The result is that many people may be or remain incarcerated,
while they do not pose a danger to society. As Fazel et al.
(2012) wrote: “One implication of these findings is that, even
after 30 years of development, the view that violence, sexual, or
criminal risk can be predicted in most cases is not evidence-
based.” This diagnosis of the current state of affairs makes it
important to look for ways to improve risk assessment in forensic
psychiatry and criminal justice.
Algorithms hold the promise of performing more accurate
predictions of criminal behavior than classic approaches,
commonly derived from various forms of regression analyses
(Berk and Hyatt, 2015). They can be used to provide measures of
individualized risk for future violence and help to make decisions
about prevention and treatment, in order to minimize risk factors
and accentuating protective ones. Risk assessment tools that
incorporate machine learning are already in use in pretrial risk
evaluation, sentencing, and rehabilitation (Kehl et al., 2017),
and are potentially very useful in judicial decision-making, to
guide “decisions regarding bail, probation/parole, court-ordered
treatment, and civil commitment” (Poldrack et al., 2018).
A.I. AND NEUROIMAGING
Rapid advances in brain imaging and the growing influence of
A.I. technologies in many areas of society, from social networks
to health care and police force policies (Berk et al., 2018), have
led to interest in the potential use of brain imaging combined
with A.I. to improve risk assessment and prediction of future
violent behavior.
Over the past decade, there has been a significant development
of non-invasive anatomical and functional neuroimaging
technologies, yielding a lot of data, and statistical machine
learning methods are instrumental for analyzing vast amounts
of neural data with increasing precision (Lemm et al., 2011)
and modeling high-dimensional datasets (Abraham et al., 2014).
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Applying statistical machine learning methods to neuroimaging
data is referred to as multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA)
(Ombao et al., 2017, pp164–169). These methods, unlike
conventional univariate approaches that analyze only one
location at a time, allow for the identification of spatial
and temporal patterns in the data, differentiating between
cognitive tasks or subject groups with higher sensitivity,
jointly analyzing data from individual voxels within a region
(Haynes and Rees, 2006).
Since the advent of MVPA methods, they have become a
popular approach in the “neuroimaging of healthy and clinical
populations; studies have shown that information present in
neuroimaging data can be used to decode” – to some extent –
“intentions and perceptual states, as well as discriminate between
healthy and diseased brains” (Bray et al., 2009). MVPA has
been applied to decode visual features like edge orientation
(Kamitani and Tong, 2005), the intention to perform one
task rather than another (Haynes et al., 2007), sequential
stages of task preparation (Bode and Haynes, 2009), and lie
detection (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Blitz, 2017, pp. 45–58). While
conventional functional imaging studies compare brain activity
during different experimental conditions to identify which brain
regions are activated by particular tasks, application of MVPA for
brain-reading uses “patterns of brain activity to perform a reverse
inference and decide what subjects are looking at or thinking
about” (Cox and Savoy, 2003; Bray et al., 2009).
These techniques can be considered ‘brain-reading’ or ‘mind-
reading’ techniques; they combine statistical machine-learning
methods with neuroimaging data to reveal information about the
brain/mind. Brain-reading has often been studied in the domain
of visual perception, where it aims to show how experiences are
encoded in the brain. Researchers recently succeeded in training
a deep neural network1 to perform visual image reconstruction
from the brain (Shen et al., 2019), decode visual content of
dreams (Horikawa et al., 2013), and decode what the brain
is ‘seeing’ by using A.I. to analyse fMRI scans from subjects
watching videos (Wen et al., 2017). Despite promising findings,
these methods still show many limitations that make it unlikely
that a ‘general mind-reading technique’ will appear in the very
near future. Nonetheless, the first simple applications have begun
to emerge, including brain-computer-interfaces, studies on lie-
detection and approaches for prediction of consumer decisions
in the field of neuromarketing (Haynes, 2012, pp. 29–40).
Apart from making inferences regarding the occurrence and
nature of mental states (Haynes, 2012, pp. 29–40), another
field of application of MVPA techniques is classification. For
example, it has been reported that it is possible to predict
disease onset by distinguishing individuals within a group based
on brain activity or classifying individual people into groups
based on the brain data identifying patterns of brain activity
or structures (Koutsouleris et al., 2012). Treatment responders
1A neural network is “a system composed of many simple processing elements
operating in parallel whose function is determined by network structure,
connection strengths, and the processing performed at computing elements or
nodes.” [DARPA Neural Network Study (U.S.)., United States. Air Force. Systems
Command., Lincoln Laboratory. (1989). DARPA neural network study final report.
Lexington, Mass.: The Laboratory].
can be distinguished from non-responders, by extracting patterns
of activity or structural abnormalities that are predictive
of abnormal cognitive development and particularly relevant
for prediction of clinical outcomes from neuroimaging data
(Bray et al., 2009). Some models are applied to discriminate
between clinical groups such as Alzheimer Disease patients and
cognitively normal elderly individuals (Klöppel et al., 2008),
Parkinson’s disease patients and healthy controls (Rubbert et al.,
2019), schizophrenic patients and healthy controls (Kim et al.,
2016), or to detect brain function disorders, such as Autism and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Heinsfeld et al.,
2018; Sen et al., 2018) and to discriminate between levels of
personality traits, for example psychopathy (Steele et al., 2015).
Interesting results have also been reported about prediction
of addiction outcomes; machine learning classifiers were able
to predict substance abuse treatment completion in a prison
inmate population using event-related potentials (ERPs) (Steele
et al., 2014; Fink et al., 2016) and functional network connectivity
(FNC) analyses of fMRI data (Steele et al., 2018). Furthermore,
it turned out to be possible to identify ‘neural fingerprints’
to predict cocaine abstinence during treatment using CPM, a
recently developed machine learning approach (Yip et al., 2019).
A.I. NEUROPREDICTION OF RECIDIVISM
Behavioral traits can be correlated, sometimes strongly, with
features of the human brain, and this raises new possibilities for
predictive algorithms to be developed, allowing the prediction
of dispositions of an individual. These methods are referred to
as “neuroprediction,” that is the use of structural or functional
brain variables to predict prognoses, treatment outcomes, and
behavioral forecasts (Morse, 2015). Even though at present it may
sound like science fiction, with the continuing development of
non-invasive neuroimaging techniques coupled with the growth
in the computational power of algorithms, A.I. neuroprediction
of recidivism is likely to become available in the near future.
Although there is still need to collect biomarkers of the
“criminal” brain, research in the field of neurocriminology has
generally focused on the analysis of structural and functional
neuromarkers of personality disorders whose main characteristic
consists of persistent antisocial conduct, such as ASPD (De Brito
et al., 2009) and psychopathy (Umbach et al., 2015), because
they appear to be the most correlated to high rates of recidivism
(Coppola, 2018). Research shows that these particular clinical
populations share many traits, such as behavioral disinhibition
or a lack of empathy, that are supposed to have common
neurobiological bases (Coppola, 2018).
For example, abnormalities in limbic and paralimbic regions
have been observed in individuals with psychopathic traits
(Anderson and Kiehl, 2012) and impairments related to the
prefrontal cortex are associated with disinhibition, emotional
lability, and impulsivity (Chow, 2000; Yang and Raine, 2009).
Still, all such neurocriminological findings, obtained using
conventional methods, do not enable us at this moment to make
predictions of future risk. However, incorporating neurodata in
A.I. prediction models appears to open up this possibility.
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A first step toward A.I. prediction models using neuroimaging
data is a study conducted by Aharoni et al. (2013), who used fMRI
data to predict recidivism. The authors showed that activation
in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), a brain region
associated with impulse control and error processing, during
a go/no-go task appeared to be associated with rearrest. The
probability that offenders with relatively low anterior cingulate
activity would be rearrested was approximately double compared
to an offender with high activity in this region, keeping all
the other risk factors constant. Low anterior cingulate activity,
therefore, might be a potential neurocognitive biomarker for
persistent criminal behavior (Aharoni et al., 2013).
Recently, a study by Kiehl et al. (2018) used machine learning
coupled with neuroimaging to test whether brain age could
help predict rearrest. Chronological young age is considered
one of the key risk factors for recidivism. Young defendants
are more likely to engage in risky behavior. Kiehl proposes
that brain age is a better measure to account for individual
differences than chronological age. The results of his study
show that a predictive model involving neural measures of
brain age performed better than previous models including only
psychological and behavioral measures.
Even more recently, a study by Delfin et al. (2019) shows that
improvements in recidivism prediction in forensic psychiatry
might be possible by incorporating neuroimaging data into
A.I. risk assessment models. The authors showed that the
inclusion of resting-state regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF)
measurements in an extended A.I. prediction model, containing
neural measurements from eight brain regions, leads to an
increase in predictive performance over traditional, empirical
risk factors in a long-term follow-up of forensic psychiatric
patients. Interestingly, they used ‘classical’ risk assessment
combined with neuroimaging, which showed a better prediction
in a forensic psychiatric population than the classical factors
alone (Delfin et al., 2019).
In sum, preliminary findings in A.I. neuroprediction studies
have produced some promising results. Still, the possible use
of A.I. and ‘brain-reading’ in forensic populations raises several
ethical and legal concerns, and the field of criminal justice should
be cautious about their future use.
It is crucial to balance the preservation of offenders’ individual
rights on the one hand and the enhancement of public
safety on the other.
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS:
TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND
PITFALLS
Despite the opportunities previously discussed regarding the
future possible use of A.I. neuroprediction techniques, several
limitations should be considered; indeed, research about
prediction tools and their successful application is still a
challenging task (Poldrack et al., 2019).
This issue is well-known in the field of computational
psychiatry, in which studies combining machine learning
approaches and neuroimaging-based single subject prediction
of brain disorders aim to classify patients with heterogeneous
disorders (Arbabshirani et al., 2017; Bzdok and Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2018). These studies, interestingly, reported varying
degrees of accuracy (Neuhaus and Popescu, 2018), raising
concerns about the methodology (Cearns et al., 2019). In
fact, there is a need for best practices in predictive modeling
(Poldrack et al., 2019); a problem of neuroprediction models
is that, even though they can manage complex data such as
brain imaging scans, they need best practices to ensure enough
statistical power to test them (Varoquaux, 2018). Several issues
deserve attention here.
First, application of neuroprediction techniques requires an
inference from group-level to individual predictions (Hahn et al.,
2017). Another challenge concerns validation of the results in a
new group – different from the data set that was used to train the
algorithm. The validity of prediction models is assessed by their
ability to generalize; for most learning algorithms, the standard
practice is to estimate the generalization performance through a
process called ‘cross-validation’: the dataset is split into two sets,
a training set, used to fit the model, and a test set (Hastie et al.,
2009; Varoquaux, 2018), and subsets of the data are used to train
and test the predictive performance of the model iteratively.
Notably, the use of cross-validation with small samples can
lead to highly variable and inflated estimates of predictive
accuracy (Luedtke et al., 2019; Poldrack et al., 2019). Training
machine learning algorithms requires large amounts of data;
using a limited sample size may cause so-called overfitting, in
which the model fits perfectly to the specific data set used to
train it, but fits poorly to new and unseen data (Hastie et al.,
2009; Poldrack et al., 2019). There is still no agreement on
the adequate size of the dataset (Cearns et al., 2019); Luedtke
et al. (2019) recommend to perform prediction analyses with
samples no smaller than several 100 observations. Acquiring
many samples, however, is often difficult and costly, especially
when neuroimaging data are involved (Arbabshirani et al., 2017).
ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
Prediction of recidivism using A.I. neuroprediction techniques
evokes ethical and legal concerns, but also new possibilities. In
what follows, we discuss some central ethical and legal issues.
First, we are confronted with the issue of bias. Since the advent
of algorithmic risk assessment, a lot of reports have documented
the fact that they are “dangerously” biased. The most famous case
of supposed A.I. prejudice was reported by ProPublica in May
2016. COMPAS, an algorithm widely used in the US to guide
sentencing by predicting the likelihood of a criminal reoffending,
turned out to be racially biased against black defendants,
according to ProPublica, because they were more likely than
white defendants to be incorrectly classified as high risk (“false
positives”)2 (Angwin et al., 2016). More recently, COMPAS
has also been depicted as a “sexist algorithm” because its
2The company that produced the Compass algorithm, Northpointe, claimed in a
report that the accuracy in the prediction of violence for both groups of defendants
was the same: around 70% of crimes were predicted correctly (see Dieterich
et al., 2016, COMPAS risk scales: demonstrating accuracy equity and predictive
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algorithmic outcomes seem to systemically overclassify women
in higher-risk groups (Hamilton, 2019). Similarly, Predpol, an
algorithm designed to predict when and where crimes will take
place, already in use in several US states, in 2016 – after an
analysis of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group – was found
to result in police unfairly targeting certain neighborhoods.
Officers were repeatedly sent to areas of the city with a high
proportion of people from racial minorities, regardless of the
effective true crime rate in those areas (Ensign et al., 2018).
Furthermore, facial recognition software, increasingly used in
law enforcement, represents another potential source of both
race and gender bias (Raji and Buolamwini, 2019). Another
example concerns Amazon’s ‘Rekognition’ software, which is
used by some police departments and other organizations. In
2018, the ACLU found that it incorrectly matched members of
the Congress with people who had been charged with a crime,
disproportionally misidentifying African-American and Latino
members of Congress as the people in mug shots3. A recent study
evaluating the accuracy of three commercial gender classifiers
showed that they performed better in classifying male subjects
than female subjects, and all of them performed worst on darker-
skinned females (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018). Moreover,
recent studies show that, if left unchecked, word embeddings A.I.
exhibit outdated gender stereotypes, such as “doctors” being male
and “receptionists” being female (Bolukbasi et al., 2016).
These findings have led to a broader debate about the fairness
of risk assessment using A.I. (Berk et al., 2018). Although
algorithmic risk assessments can be perceived as a means of
overcoming human bias, they could still reflect prejudice and
institutionalized bias. A.I. is trained on data – for example,
criminal files – that may themselves reflect biases on the part
of police officers, prosecutors, or judges. Based on these data,
the algorithm then “concludes” that groups with certain traits
are more dangerous than others, while in fact, this is the result
of biased data. This sometimes is referred to as “bias in-bias
out.” The results of A.I. prediction, in other words, highly
depend on the quality of the data used. One advantage of
using neuroimaging data – instead of police files – might be
that neuroimaging does not reflect human bias. A.I. looks for
correlations between brain activity and recidivism. Therefore,
A.I. neuroprediction may offer possibilities to decrease bias in
risk assessment. However, also since neuroprediction may be
incorporated in existing risk assessment tools (see the study by
Delfin et al., 2019), bias will remain a problem as long as there is
no solution to bias in algorithms in general.
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that risk assessment is
“quintessentially discriminatory” (Binns, 2017), meaning that it
parity. Retrieved from www.documentcloud.org/documents/2998391-ProPublica-
Commentary-Final-070616.html). The different levels of false positives among
black defendants and white defendants were to be attributed, according to
Northpointe, to different base rates in the prevalence of crime among black and
white defendants. It is possible to have the algorithm acquire the same level of false
positives over groups with a different base rate. However, this comes at the cost
of reduced accuracy. There is an extensive literature on fairness in A.I. prediction,
and its trade-offs (Berk et al., 2018). The text about these algorithms is partially
based on Cossins (2018).
3https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/
amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28
is all about classifying subjects into groups of low or high-risk
individuals based on group traits. Neuromarkers for recidivism
will undoubtedly be more prevalent in certain groups than
in others. Treating groups of people differently because of
their “brain” raises difficult questions about what constitutes
unjustified unequal treatment. This question, however, is not
typical of A.I. neuroprediction, but is a central issue in risk
assessment and fairness in general (Nadelhoffer et al., 2012, p. 95;
Tonry, 2014). Classifying people into groups based on their brain
scan, even if useful to prevent possible harms, could easily lead
to stigmatization and discriminating effects for those considered
“high risk” in other aspects of the individual’s life. It could become
a sort of modern phrenology, by discriminating between people
based on what their brain looks like. While certain institutional
procedures could discriminate against those considered “high
risk,” stigmatization could be a more social process that excludes
certain individuals based on their risk profile; for instance,
stigmatization may be a consequence of sex offenders’ registration
(Tewksbury, 2005).
A second point concerns privacy. The neurodata and other
data used to predict recidivism can clearly also be of interest for
other purposes. For instance, for insurance companies, or when
screening job applicants. Who should have access to these data,
and under which conditions? Should insurance companies have
access to them, and if not, should they be able to request such
a procedure in order to assess the risk of a particular candidate
client? Clearly, in this case, data protection – and possible access –
is a fundamental issue, already highly debated in algorithms used
in the era of big data. Obviously, there is also a parallel with the
current debate on the nature of consent and the degree of control
citizens have regarding health information in biobanks. The
discussion of commercialization of genetic/health information
and rights of control (“biorights”) are likely to intensify in the
coming years (see also Caulfield and Murdoch, 2017).
A third, related point concerns the probability of a negative
‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’ This qualm comes from recent studies,
showing that receiving genetic risk information can actually
influence your behavior, physiology, and subjective experience
and change your overall risk profile (Turnwald et al., 2019).
Researchers from Stanford University found that when people
were told of a genetic tendency for either obesity or lower exercise
capacity, acquiring this information had a physiological impact
on their bodies, modifying how they responded to a meal or
to exercise. A persistent discovery was that perceptions of risk
altered health outcomes, therefore those informed of having the
high-risk gene had a worse outcome than those informed of
having the protective one (Turnwald et al., 2019). Following these
findings, one may wonder how the mindset of people may be
affected when you inform them about their own risk information,
either genetic or neural, and how this could actually alter their
risk profile. This shows that providing information may also
require ethical and/or legal research and regulation.
Furthermore, it is still not clear how to exactly classify
and conceptualize neurodata as risk factors. For example, in
a study by Kiehl et al. (2018), a measure of brain age (gray
matter) is used to predict recidivism. Chronological age is often
considered a static factor, but when referring to brain measures,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 220
fpsyg-11-00220 March 14, 2020 Time: 17:29 # 6
Tortora et al. Neuroprediction and A.I. in Forensic Psychiatry
we should reflect on how they should be conceptualized among
risk factors. For instance, given the plasticity of the brain,
should we consider brain age as a dynamic or static risk
variable? How do we evaluate an offender if, for example,
brain age and normal age differs, and how would this modify
his/her neuroprediction profile? If we consider neurodata as
dynamic factors, and, as such, available to be modified through
interventions, we could talk, instead of in terms of a pure
“prediction,” in terms of targets for treatment and other
intervention types. Used in this way, neuroprediction could help
to prevent crime through more individualized correctional and
socio-rehabilitative measures, and could also enable offenders
to return to the community sooner. As in “personalized
medicine” – a therapeutic approach in which an individual’s
genetic and epigenetic information is used to tailor drug therapy
or preventive care4 – neuroprediction could help to target
interventions to the individual’s “needs.”
There is another effect of the emphasis on prediction that
is relevant here. Currently, A.I. is used in the criminal justice
system, mainly to predict recidivism. A.I. risk assessment
typically does not offer a causal model of crime and therefore, is
not designed to show opportunities to intervene and to mitigate
risk (Berk, 2019, pp. 17–18). Barabas et al. (2018) conclude:
“when risk assessments are used primarily as a predictive
technology, they fuel harmful trends toward mass incarceration
and growing inequality in the justice system.”
We should acknowledge that A.I. neuroprediction in the
first place merely establishes correlations between brain images
and the risk of recidivism. However, if it is indeed possible
to develop interventions based on neurodata, this might offer
offenders an opportunity to avoid incarceration (Nadelhoffer
et al., 2012, pp. 85–86). This could be possible because,
different from historical data and other risk variables, like
a person’s demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, age,
and gender, that cannot be changed, neurodata hold the
potential to become targets for new rehabilitative interventions
and prevention programs, aiming to reduce exposure to
risk factors for psychopathic traits and preventing at-risk
individuals from engaging in criminal behavior later in life
(Ling and Raine, 2018).
This is particularly important since the prison environment
may have negative effects on neurocognitive functioning. In fact,
studies found that incarceration might lead to reduced self-
control (Meijers et al., 2018). Still, the possibility of intervention
also entails its own ethical and legal issues: for an offender, it
may be hard to choose between a deprivation of liberty and
undergoing (possibly somewhat invasive) treatment, especially
in light of the right to refuse medical treatment (Meynen,
2018). However, this again is not a problem that is typical of
interventions based on “A.I. neuroprediction.”
A fourth, and related, issue concerns consent and coercion; if
and when these techniques will be fully developed and are ready
to be used, there may be a possibility of performing cognitive
liberty violations forcing people to undergo scans without
consent for sentencing or punitive purposes (Ligthart, 2019;
4https://www.nature.com/subjects/personalized-medicine
Meynen, 2019). Coercion, both technical and ethical or legal,
not only relates to the force used, because not all the imaging
techniques allow for this, but also to their use within the context
of a threat or an offer that cannot be refused (Meynen, 2017). One
way to counter this issue is to strictly regulate informed consent
for neuroprediction tests.
Fifth, we should take into account something called the
“seductive allure” that neuroimaging exerts on courts. Juries
and judges apparently tend to overestimate the accuracy of
neuroscientific evidence, and, although neuroimaging aims to
reduce uncertainty and to increase the objectivity in forensic
settings, the use of neuroimaging in courts is at risk of being
misleading, due to cognitive biases in the evaluation of evidence
(Scarpazza et al., 2018). Introducing neuroprediction could
therefore lead to some overreliance on neurodata.
Furthermore, machine learning algorithms are considered
to be ‘black-boxes of decision-making’; the way in which they
perform decisions is not fully comprehensible to stakeholders,
and not even to expert data scientists (London, 2019; Pedreschi
et al., 2019). In addition, we have to be cautious about what is
called the “the control problem”; i.e., the tendency of human
operators to become complacent with machines, devolving
responsibility and becoming over-reliant on the outputs of
autonomous systems, even when they are biased (Pedreschi et al.,
2019). In order to avoid overreliance, it seems important for A.I.
systems to be transparent: it should be possible to explain to
judges and a jury how they produce their results (Gunning and
Aha, 2019), and stakeholders should be capable to appropriately
trust and manage these tools, reasoning on how a specific output
is given and on the basis of what rationale (Pedreschi et al., 2019).
Even if this is actually complicated by the fact that most risk
assessment algorithms are proprietary, it seems important for
society that A.I. algorithms can be made intelligible, in order to
be accountable for their decisions (Weld and Bansal, 2019).
Of note, legal systems may have criteria for the admissibility
of scientific evidence in the courtroom. For instance, in the US
legal context Daubert and Frye are used as standards. As we do
not focus on specific legal systems, we will not go into this in
more detail, but clearly such legal criteria would be relevant for
courtroom use of new technologies (Shats et al., 2016).
Moreover, it is important to make a decision about the
required accuracy of these technologies. Current risk assessment
tools often have an AUC of about 0.70 (Douglas et al., 2017);
is that enough for such algorithms, or should the threshold be
higher, like 0.80 or 0.90? These are normative choices that have
to be made before deciding to allow the use of this kind of
technology to prevent crime.
Additionally, we need to consider the lack, at present, of a
‘true’ prediction model; a limitation of the papers previously
discussed is that, instead of talking about ‘pure’ prediction, they
can be classified as postdiction studies; postdiction generally
relates to retrospectively making an assertion or deduction about
an event based on information available after the event (Yamada
et al., 2015) but, as applied to the context of statistical models,
the distinction between prediction and postdiction is about
whether the assessment of the model’s success involves the same
data as were used to build the model or new data not used
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in model construction (Gauch and Zobel, 1988; Hastie et al.,
2009). Research suggests that models for predictive applications,
such as biomarkers, require larger sample sizes than standard
statistical approaches (Varoquaux, 2018). Furthermore, in the
studies discussed before, data about neuromarkers of recidivism
have been collected after the commission of crimes, so we cannot
establish when brain differences observed developed (Cope et al.,
2014). A future challenge is to develop a true prediction model,
able to identify those at the highest risk for committing crimes,
and research in neuroimaging coupled with A.I. may be the key
in developing such model.
Finally, there appears to be a more remote problem, looming
on the horizon. Suppose that these A.I. algorithms – either with or
without brain imaging – become really good predictors, wouldn’t
that introduce a form of determinism we have not witnessed
before? The A.I. system may be considered to have some “divine”
foreknowledge about what will happen, which may have negative
effects on the freedom people experience and exert. A belief in
free will seems to have positive effects (Crescioni et al., 2016;
Feldman et al., 2016).
Still, the more pressing concern nowadays is that we are
not quite good at predicting risk – even with A.I. – and that
we nonetheless often apply sanctions based on the supposed
dangerousness of the offender. If A.I. becomes more accurate
with the help of neuroimaging, it could reduce the number
of persons incorrectly classified as high risk and can therefore
reduce sanctions that in fact are not legitimate, helping to
interrupt the so-called “cycles of crime” (Barabas et al., 2018).
CONCLUSION
There is still a way to go before combined neuroscience and
AI-based violence risk assessment tools can be implemented
in the criminal justice system. Still, A.I. is already being
used in criminal justice systems. Because of the far-reaching
consequences of these type of technologies – and also given some
rapid developments in recent years – it is important to consider
ethical and legal concerns. Besides discussing technological
limitations and pitfalls of predictive analysis, we identified six
key issues deserving attention: dealing with bias, privacy, the
possibility of a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy,’ coercion and consent,
the allure of neuroimaging data and the need for A.I. systems
to be explainable. Finally, we pointed to the more remote
issue of how highly accurate predictions might introduce a
form of determinism we have not witnessed before – but this
is still far away.
Still, we would like to emphasize that accurate risk prediction
is extremely valuable for both safety and justice reasons.
Therefore, in principle, we argue that technologies that may be
helpful in this respect should at least be explored, and if ready,
used in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry. In addition,
neuroprediction and A.I. bring their own, in a way new, ethical
and legal challenges, and we will have to deal with them –
preferably before the technologies are used. More specifically, we
have to find solutions to prevent systems from reflecting our own
human biases in order to enable them to provide objective and
trustworthy data.
Therefore, we argue that the use of AI-based systems in
criminal justice and forensic psychiatry should be subjected
to substantial regulation to protect citizens from system
errors or misuse. On such basis, we highlight the importance
of accurate harms/benefits analyses not only when these
technologies will be fully available, but also while they are being
researched and developed.
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